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Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems

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  • Dinah Rosenberg
  • Eilon Solan
  • Nicolas Vieille

Abstract

We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.
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  • Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Discussion Papers 1396, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1396
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    References listed on IDEAS

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