Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop new methods of analysis for such large games, and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria. We show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model. Although the beliefs converge to truth, learning takes place too late. Ex-ante welfare is strictly between that without observational learning and that with full information.
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