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Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members

  • Mikael Apel
  • Carl Andreas Claussen
  • Petra Gerlach-Kristen
  • Petra Lennartsdotter
  • Øistein Røisland

    ()

    (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))

How do monetary policy committee (MPC) members form their views about the appropriate interest rate? To what extent do they change their minds during the deliberations in the interest rate meeting? How important is the Chairman? The theoretical literature makes assumptions about these issues. We have asked actual MPC members in Sweden and Norway. This paper reports the results from this unique survey and discusses how well existing theories on monetary policy by committee capture the reality.

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File URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Published/Papers/Working-Papers/2013/WP-201303/
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Paper provided by Norges Bank in its series Working Paper with number 2013/03.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2013_03
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