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Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis

  • Potrafke, Niklas

I study diversity in views expressed by economists regarding appropriate economic policies. The dataset is for voting by economists on the German Council of Economic Experts, over the period 1971-2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is having been nominated by the trade unions, which results in being some 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion. The voting pattern confirms that ideological identity through the channel of political appointment influences economists’ voting behavior.

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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 19290.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published in European Journal of Political Economy 31(2013): pp. 180-187
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19290
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