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Minority Positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A Political Economic Analysis

  • Niklas Potrafke

    ()

I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 1971-2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions is about 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-04/cesifo1_wp4206.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4206.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4206
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