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Ideology and Dissent among Economists: The Joint Economic Forecast of German Economic Research Institutes

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  • Ha Quyen Ngo
  • Niklas Potrafke

    ()

  • Marina Riem
  • Christoph Schinke

    ()

Abstract

Economists, and also economic research institutes, differ in their attitudes towards desirability of economic policies. The policy positions taken can often be determined by ideology. We examine economic policy positions by investigating minority votes in the Joint Economic Forecast of German economic research institutes. The dataset consists of voting behavior over the period 1950-2014. Our results show that the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) submitted by far the most minority votes, consistent with the popular impression that the DIW exhibits a preference for demand-oriented economic policy and has differed from the other leading economic research institutes in this respect. For example, the rate of minority voting of the DIW corresponded to some 300% of the rate of minority voting of the RWI Essen. Minority votes display an economic research institute’s identity. When institutes are known to be associated with specific economic-policy positions, politicians, clients, and voters well understand how to assess the bias in the policy advice that is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Ha Quyen Ngo & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem & Christoph Schinke, 2015. "Ideology and Dissent among Economists: The Joint Economic Forecast of German Economic Research Institutes," CESifo Working Paper Series 5393, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5393
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    Cited by:

    1. Jörg Döpke & Ulrich Fritsche & Gabi Waldhof, 2017. "Theories, techniques and the formation of German business cycle forecasts: Evidence from a survey of professional forecasters," Macroeconomics and Finance Series 201701, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    2. Christoph Schinke, 2016. "Wealth and Politics: Studies on Inter Vivos Transfers and Partisan Effects," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 67.
    3. Ulrich Fritsche & Johannes Puckelwald, 2018. "Deciphering Professional Forecasters’ Stories - Analyzing a Corpus of Textual Predictions for the German Economy," Macroeconomics and Finance Series 201804, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decision making in committees; minority voting; policy preferences; ideology; Joint Economic Forecast of German economic research institutes;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions

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