Public Choice and Public Policy: The Vulnerability of Economic Advice to the Interpretation of Politicians
The confidence with which politicians defend their policies is in marked contrast to the qualifications which academic researchers attach to their results. The difference is indicative of a failure of the political market whereby politicians have an incentive to select policies for electoral and ideological reasons and to minimize any uncertainty associated with policy effectiveness. In this scenario dissension between economists is of value if it alerts individuals to the sensitivity of policy "answers" to the framework in which they are derived. Moreover, with government failure, public choice analysts are faced with the problem of how best to amend policy advice in order to allow for potential distortion at the hands of politicians. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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