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Policymakers' Votes and Predictability of Monetary Policy

  • Sirchenko, Andrei

The National Bank of Poland does not publish the Monetary Policy Council's voting records before the subsequent policy meeting. Using real-time data, this paper shows that a prompter release of the voting records could improve the predictability of policy decisions. The voting patterns reveal strong and robust predictive content even after controlling for policy bias and responses to inflation, real activity, exchange rates and financial market information. They contain information not embedded in the spreads and moves in the market interest rates, nor in the explicit forecasts of the next policy decision made by market analysts in Reuters surveys. Moreover, the direction of policymakers' dissent explains the direction of analysts' forecast bias. These findings are based on the voting patterns only, without the knowledge of policymakers' names.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt8qj3z3qg.

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Date of creation: 05 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt8qj3z3qg
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  19. Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
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