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How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts

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  • MIKAEL APEL
  • MARIANNA BLIX GRIMALDI
  • ISAIAH HULL

Abstract

The purpose of central bank minutes is to give an account of monetary policy meeting discussions to outside observers, thereby enabling them to draw informed conclusions about future policy. However, minutes are by necessity a shortened and edited representation of a broader discussion. Consequently, they may omit information that is predictive of future policy decisions. To investigate this, we compare the predictive content of the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) minutes and transcripts, focusing on dimensions that are likely to be excluded from the minutes, such as the committee's degree of hawkishness, the chairperson's degree of hawkishness, and the level of agreement between committee members. We measure committee and chairperson hawkishness with a new dictionary that is constructed using the FOMC's minutes and transcripts. Agreement is measured using a technique we import from the machine learning literature. We also show that transcripts contain predictive content that is not included in FOMC minutes, macroeconomic variables, financial variables, forecasts, or federal funds rate futures.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:54:y:2022:i:5:p:1459-1490
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12885
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    Cited by:

    1. Tillmann, Peter, 2021. "Financial markets and dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Arango, Luis E. & Pantoja, Javier & Velásquez, Carlos, 2023. "A content analysis of the Central Bank's press releases in Colombia," Latin American Journal of Central Banking (previously Monetaria), Elsevier, vol. 4(3).
    3. Hamza Bennani & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Exploring the informativeness and drivers of tone during committee meetings: the case of the Federal Reserve," Post-Print hal-04670309, HAL.
    4. Parle, Conor, 2022. "The financial market impact of ECB monetary policy press conferences — A text based approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    5. Jonathan Hambur & Qazi Haque, 2024. "Can we Use High‐Frequency Data to Better Understand the Effects of Monetary Policy and its Communication? Yes and No!," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 100(328), pages 3-43, March.
    6. Guillaume Belly & Lukas Boeckelmann & Carlos Mateo Caicedo Graciano & Alberto Di Iorio & Klodiana Istrefi & Vasileios Siakoulis & Arthur Stalla‐Bourdillon, 2023. "Forecasting sovereign risk in the Euro area via machine learning," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 657-684, April.
    7. Bertsch, Christoph & Hull, Isaiah & Lumsdaine, Robin L. & Zhang, Xin, 2022. "Central Bank Mandates and Monetary Policy Stances: through the Lens of Federal Reserve Speeches," Working Paper Series 417, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Sep 2024.
    8. Thierry Warin & Aleksandar Stojkov, 2023. "“Decoding” Policy Perspectives: Structural Topic Modeling of European Central Bankers’ Speeches," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(7), pages 1-23, July.
    9. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Kwok Ping Tsang & Zichao Yang, 2023. "Agree to Disagree: Measuring Hidden Dissent in FOMC Meetings," Papers 2308.10131, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    11. Martin T. Bohl & Dimitrios Kanelis & Pierre L. Siklos, 2022. "How Central Bank Mandates Influence Content and Tone of Communication Over Time," CQE Working Papers 9622, Center for Quantitative Economics (CQE), University of Muenster.
    12. Daniel Aromí & Daniel Heymann, 2024. "Talk to Fed: a Big Dive into FOMC Transcripts," Working Papers 323, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    13. Saito, Yuta, 2024. "Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-30.
    14. Bohl, Martin T. & Kanelis, Dimitrios & Siklos, Pierre L., 2023. "Central bank mandates: How differences can influence the content and tone of central bank communication," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    15. Yu, Zhen & Liu, Wei & Yang, Fuyu, 2023. "A central bankers’ sentiment index of global financial cycle," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    16. Davide Romelli & Hamza Bennani, 2021. "Disagreement inside the FOMC: New Insights from Tone Analysis," Trinity Economics Papers tep1021, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    17. Liu, Chunzi & Chen, Xiaoli, 2024. "Spillover effects of multidimensional information in Fed statements on China's bond market," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PB), pages 712-741.
    18. Hüpper, Florian & Kempa, Bernd, 2023. "Inflation targeting and inflation communication of the Federal Reserve: Words and deeds," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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