Making Monetary Policy by Committee
This paper considers a number of design features of monetary policy committees (MPCs), including their size and composition, the degree of consensus for which they strive, the role of the committee chair, voting procedures, methods of appointment and communication techniques. Real-world MPCs vary substantially in all these respects and more. Based on the theoretical and empirical research to date, most of which is of very recent vintage, a tentative set of 'best practices' is proposed. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (08)
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