Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees
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Keywordsmonetary policy; committee; delegation; imperfect information;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2009-11-07 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MON-2009-11-07 (Monetary Economics)
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