IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Metaphern, Begriffe und Bedeutungen: Das Beispiel internationale monetäre Institutionen

  • Muchlinski, Elke
Registered author(s):

    Das Ziel des Forschungsvorhabens besteht zum einen darin, die Bedeutungskonstitution zu untersuchen. Zum anderen soll gezeigt werden, dass nationale und internationale monetäre Institutionen in ihren Kommunikationsformen nicht einem linear-kausalen Kommunikationsmodell folgen. Der neue methodische Ansatz versteht sich komplementär zu den formal analytischen Begriffskonstruktionen. Ökonomie als Erfahrungswissenschaft bedarf eines vielfältigen Methodenrepertoires. Die Unabdingbarkeit der Methodenvielfalt resultiert aus dem Mandat der Preisstabilität der Zentralbanken, das sie im Kontext von Unsicherheit über die Steuerung der Erwartungen der Finanzmarktakteure zu erfüllen versuchen. Die Erwartungssteuerung gelingt nicht als lineare Projektion gegebener Erwartungen oder Bedeutungen. Sie gelingt über die Sprachvermitteltheit, die Verwendung von Metaphern und Begriffen in ökonomischen Interaktionen. Bedeutungen sind nicht ex ante gegeben. Der innovative Ansatz soll anhand der Entwicklung der Amerikanischen und Europäischen Zentralbank sowie der Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich weiterentwickelt und überprüft werden. Das Projekt verbindet den Forschungsstand zu monetären Institutionen mit der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43690/1/637216997.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2010/14.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201014
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Garystr. 21, 14195 Berlin (Dahlem)
    Phone: (030) 838 2272
    Fax: (030) 838 2129
    Web page: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/en/index.html
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Friedrich Heinemann & Katrin Ullrich, 2007. "Does it Pay to Watch Central Bankers’ Lips? The Information Content of ECB Wording," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 143(II), pages 155-185, June.
    2. Reeves, Rachel & Sawicki, Michael, 2007. "Do financial markets react to Bank of England communication?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 207-227, March.
    3. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Does Money Matter in the ECB Strategy? New Evidence Based on ECB Communication," KOF Working papers 06-125, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    5. José Antonio Ocampo, 2007. "The Instability and Inequities of the Global Reserve System," International Journal of Political Economy, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 36(4), pages 71-96, December.
    6. George A. Akerlof, 2007. "The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 5-36, March.
    7. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2005. "The timing of central bank communication," Working Paper Series 0565, European Central Bank.
    8. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2008. "The Stress of Having a Single Monetary Policy in Europe," KOF Working papers 08-190, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    9. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2007. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 13259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. José Antonio Ocampo, 2007. "The Instability and Inequities of the Global Reserve System," Working Papers 59, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    11. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "Explaining monetary policy in press conferences," Working Paper Series 0767, European Central Bank.
    12. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 2009. "How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1175-1175.
    14. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, 08.
    15. Morishima, Michio, 1991. "General Equilibrium Theory in the Twenty-First Century," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 69-74, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.