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From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication

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  • Donato Masciandaro
  • Davide Romelli

Abstract

In the Concluding Remarks that Paolo Baffi - Governor of Bank of Italy - read on 31 May 1979, he stressed that “the actions of central banks are no longer cloaked in silence, and perhaps never will be again. Whereas in the past silence was seen as a guarantee of independence, today this is achieved by giving an explicit account of one’s actions”. In the Governor’s words it is evident and illuminating the precognition of the increasing importance of the links between monetary policy, central bank governance and communication in influencing the overall effectiveness of the monetary action in the modern economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2016. "From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1627, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1627
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hanna O. Sakhno, 2018. "Central Bank Communication In The Xxi Century: A Survey Of Theory And Evidence," HSE Working papers WP BRP 16/PSP/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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