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The reception of public signals in financial markets - what if central bank communication becomes stale?

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  • Ehrmann, Michael
  • Sondermann, David

Abstract

How do financial markets price new information? This paper analyzes price setting at the intersection of private and public information, by testing whether and how the reaction of financial markets to public signals depends on the relative importance of private information in agents’ information sets at a given point in time. It studies the reaction of UK short-term interest rates to the Bank of England’s inflation report and to macroeconomic announcements. Due to the quarterly frequency at which the Bank of England releases one of its main publications, it can become stale over time. In the course of this process, financial market participants need to rely more on private information. The paper develops a stylized model which predicts that, the more time has elapsed since the latest release of an inflation report, market volatility should increase, the price response to macroeconomic announcements should be more pronounced, and macroeconomic announcements should play a more important role in aligning agents’ information set, thus leading to a stronger volatility reduction. The empirical evidence is fully supportive of these hypotheses. JEL Classification: E58, E43, G12, G14

Suggested Citation

  • Ehrmann, Michael & Sondermann, David, 2009. "The reception of public signals in financial markets - what if central bank communication becomes stale?," Working Paper Series 1077, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20091077
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Neuenkirch, 2014. "Federal Reserve communications and newswire coverage," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(25), pages 3119-3129, September.
    2. Magdalena Szyszko, 2013. "The interdependences of central bank’s forecasts and inflation expectations of consumers," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 44(1), pages 33-66.
    3. Faia, Ester, 2017. "Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors’ pessimism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 79-96.
    4. Philipp Mohl & David Sondermann, 2013. "Has political communication during the crisis impacted sovereign bond spreads in the euro area?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 48-61, January.
    5. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2016. "From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1627, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    announcement effects; Bank of England; co-ordination of beliefs; inflation reports; interest rates; monetary policy; public signals;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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