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Too Little, Too Late? Monetary Policymaking Inertia and Psychology: A Behavioral Model

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  • Federico Favaretto
  • Donato Masciandaro

Abstract

Can the inertia in the monetary policymaking be attributed to psychological drivers? Our model shows two results. First, our baseline model with individual loss aversion explains inertia in a monetary policy committee (MPC) where holds a de jure majority rule. Second, our second model shows that introducing a specification of loss aversion for all members in a MPC leads to inertial decisions when status-quo ination is below the ination target. Conversely when status-quo ination is above the target rate, inertial policy does not occur until the level of ination discounts the loss aversion mechanism. In the framework of a hawk-dove dimension we conclude that loss aversion favors inertial monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2016. "Too Little, Too Late? Monetary Policymaking Inertia and Psychology: A Behavioral Model," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1617, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1617
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2016. "From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1627, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy; Behavioral Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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