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Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers

Author

Listed:
  • Donato Masciandaro
  • Paola Profeta
  • Davide Romelli

Abstract

This paper analyses the gender representation in monetary policy committees, offering three contributions. We propose the first index to evaluate the gender representation in monetary policymaking – i.e. the GMP Index – for a sample of 112 countries as of 2015. Second, we investigate the drivers of gender diversity in monetary policy committees. Our results show that, besides legal (Common Law), religious (Orthodox), historical (French colony) and socio-economic (female labour force) drivers, the gender representation is more likely to be relevant in countries characterized by a well-defined central bank governance, i.e. more independent central banks and less involved in supervision. Finally, we test whether gender diversity in central bank boards affects the conduct of monetary policy and hence macroeconomic outcomes. We find that gender diversity is inversely associated with inflation rates and money growth. The presence of women in central bank boards seems to be associated with a more hawkish approach to monetary policy making.

Suggested Citation

  • Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1512
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:59-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Diouf, Ibrahima & Pépin, Dominique, 2017. "Gender and central banking," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 193-206.
    3. Charléty, Patricia & Romelli, Davide & Santacreu-Vasut, Estefania, 2017. "Appointments to central bank boards: Does gender matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 59-61.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation; Monetary Policy; Central Banks and their Policies; Gender Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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