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Central bank independence and ageing


  • Farvaque, Etienne
  • Héricourt, Jérôme
  • Lagadec, Gaël


We contrast the influence of demography and central bank independence on inflation. The recent demographic trends in developed countries are shown to weight more on inflation than central bank independence, while the contrary stands for the period from 1960 to 1979.

Suggested Citation

  • Farvaque, Etienne & Héricourt, Jérôme & Lagadec, Gaël, 2008. "Central bank independence and ageing," MPRA Paper 13076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13076

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Brumm, Harold J., 2002. "Inflation and Central Bank independence revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 205-209, October.
    2. Angela Maddaloni & Alberto Musso & Philipp Rother & Melanie Ward-Warmedinger & Thomas Westermann, 2006. "Macroeconomic implications of demographic developments in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 51, European Central Bank.
    3. Farvaque, Etienne, 2002. "Political determinants of central bank independence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-135, September.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. Peter Pedroni, 2000. "Fully Modified OLS for Heterogeneous Cointegrated Panels," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    6. Lindh, Thomas & Malmberg, Bo, 1998. "Age structure and inflation - a Wicksellian interpretation of the OECD data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 19-37, July.
    7. Im, Kyung So & Pesaran, M. Hashem & Shin, Yongcheol, 2003. "Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 53-74, July.
    8. Maddala, G S & Wu, Shaowen, 1999. " A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 61(0), pages 631-652, Special I.
    9. Levin, Andrew & Lin, Chien-Fu & James Chu, Chia-Shang, 2002. "Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-24, May.
    10. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
    11. Peter Pedroni, 2001. "Purchasing Power Parity Tests In Cointegrated Panels," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 727-731, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA.
    2. Dumiter, Florin Cornel, 2011. "Estimating the Impact of Central Bank Independence upon Macroeconomic Performance using a Panel Data Model," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), pages 106-128, December.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Hayat, Muhammad Azmat & Farvaque, Etienne, 2012. "Public attitudes towards central bank independence: Lessons from the foundation of the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 512-523.

    More about this item


    Demography ; Central Bank Independence ; Inflation;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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