Estimating the Impact of Central Bank Independence upon Macroeconomic Performance using a Panel Data Model
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More about this item
Keywordsindex of central bank independence and inflation targeting; central bank governance; central bank transparency and accountability; political and legal central bank independence; inflation rates; panel data;
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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