Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends
This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 56 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK|
Web: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pal/subscribe/index.html Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001.
" Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- International Monetary Fund, 1998. "Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies," IMF Working Papers 98/25, International Monetary Fund.
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995.
"The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence,"
9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Catao, Luis A.V. & Terrones, Marco E., 2005.
"Fiscal deficits and inflation,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 529-554, April.
- Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003.
"Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability,"
CESifo Economic Studies,
CESifo, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
- Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
- Mishkin, F.S., 1998.
"International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes,"
648, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, 1999. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," NBER Working Papers 6965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mishkin, Frederic S., 1998. "International Experiences With Different Monetary Policy Regimes," Seminar Papers 648, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," NBER Working Papers 7044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004.
"The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2002. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," NBER Working Papers 8963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2004. "The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A reinterpretation," MPRA Paper 14070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shang-Jin Wei & Irina Tytell, 2004. "Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic Policies?," IMF Working Papers 04/84, International Monetary Fund.
- Boschen, John F & Weise, Charles L, 2003. " What Starts Inflation: Evidence from the OECD Countries," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 323-49, June.
- Bernard Laurens & Marco Arnone & Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy; Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Oatley, Thomas, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Corporatism, Partisanship, and Alternative Indices of Central Bank Independence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 399-413, March.
- Jonathan David Ostry & Anne Marie Gulde & Atish R. Ghosh & Holger C. Wolf, 1995.
"Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?,"
IMF Working Papers
95/121, International Monetary Fund.
- Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Jonathan D. Ostry & Holger C. Wolf, 1997. "Does The Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," Working Papers 97-09, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Jonathan D. Ostry & Holger C. Wolf, 1997. "Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," NBER Working Papers 5874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Bernard Laurens & Rodolfo Maino, 2007. "China; Strengthening Monetary Policy Implementation," IMF Working Papers 07/14, International Monetary Fund.
- Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:fip:fedgsq:y:2007:i:jan5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:56:y:2009:i:2:p:263-296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Iulia Badea)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.