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Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Analysis

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  • Yannick LUCOTTE

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  • Yannick LUCOTTE, 2009. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Analysis," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 303, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
  • Handle: RePEc:leo:wpaper:303
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