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Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen

Listed author(s):
  • Marc Bassoni
  • André Cartapanis

[fre] Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques. Un réexamen L'objet de cet article est de soumettre à réexamen le débat relatif aux statuts de la Banque centrale en exhibant les principales zones d'ombre de la thèse « conventionnelle » de l'autonomie. À cette fin, nous soulignons non seulement les difficultés auxquelles se heurte le constat empirique des relations existant entre degrés d'autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-écono­miques globales, mais également les incertitudes qui entachent les fondements théoriques de l'approche « conventionnelle » de l'autonomie. [eng] Central banks independence and macroeconomic performances : a reconsideration The main purpose of this paper is to reconsider the debate about the central bank independence by emphasing the limits of conventional analysis. To this end, we'll first of all exhibit the empirical difficulties which faces the study of the relationships between cen­tral bank independence and macroeconomic outcomes, then we'll explore the theoretical grounds of independence thesis, laying stress on some questionable key-ideas.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/reco.1995.409651
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 46 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 415-432

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409651
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Hetzel, Robert L., 1990. "Central banks' independence in historical perspective : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 165-176, January.
  2. Robert E. Hall, 1982. "Introduction to "Inflation: Causes and Effects"," NBER Chapters,in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 1-10 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jean-Pierre Patat, 1992. "Quelques remarques sur la question de l'indépendance de la Banque centrale," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(3), pages 5-12.
  4. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
  5. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
  7. Burdekin, Richard C K & Laney, Leroy O, 1988. "Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 647-662.
  8. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
  9. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, January.
  10. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
  11. Walsh, Carl E., 1993. "Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-302, November.
  12. Jean-Pierre Patat & Jacques Bozzi, 1993. "Les politiques monétaires au cours du cycle économique," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(3), pages 51-64.
  13. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
  14. Jean-Pierre Petit, 1992. "Contenu et critères de l'indépendance des Banques centrales," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(3), pages 19-30.
  15. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1990. "Why does money affect output? A survey," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 779-835 Elsevier.
  16. Jean-Marc Daniel & Alain Gubian & Hélène Harasty, 1993. "Finances publiques en Europe : un blocage généralisé ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(1), pages 175-209.
  17. Ben Bernanke & Frederic Mishkin, 1992. "Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations from Six Industrialized Countries," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, Volume 7, pages 183-238 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 425-436, November.
  19. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
  20. Robert E. Hall, 1982. "Inflation: Causes and Effects," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number hall82-1, November.
  21. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
  22. Michel Aglietta, 1993. "Crises et cycles financiers : une approche comparative," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(3), pages 5-50.
  23. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 1994. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et politique budgétaire," Working Papers 1994-02, CEPII research center.
  24. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
  25. International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence; Issues and Experience," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
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