IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Bassoni
  • André Cartapanis

Abstract

[fre] Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques. Un réexamen. . L'objet de cet article est de soumettre à réexamen le débat relatif aux statuts de la Banque centrale en exhibant les principales zones d'ombre de la thèse « conventionnelle » de l'autonomie. À cette fin, nous soulignons non seulement les difficultés auxquelles se heurte le constat empirique des relations existant entre degrés d'autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-écono­miques globales, mais également les incertitudes qui entachent les fondements théoriques de l'approche « conventionnelle » de l'autonomie. [eng] Central banks independence and macroeconomic performances : a reconsideration. . The main purpose of this paper is to reconsider the debate about the central bank independence by emphasing the limits of conventional analysis. To this end, we'll first of all exhibit the empirical difficulties which faces the study of the relationships between cen­tral bank independence and macroeconomic outcomes, then we'll explore the theoretical grounds of independence thesis, laying stress on some questionable key-ideas.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Bassoni & André Cartapanis, 1995. "Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 415-432.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409651
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.1995.409651
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hetzel, Robert L., 1990. "Central banks' independence in historical perspective : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 165-176, January.
    2. Jean-Pierre Patat, 1992. "Quelques remarques sur la question de l'indépendance de la Banque centrale," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(3), pages 5-12.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, January.
    6. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
    7. Walsh, Carl E., 1993. "Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-302, November.
    8. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1990. "Why does money affect output? A survey," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 779-835 Elsevier.
    9. Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 425-436, November.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    11. Robert E. Hall, 1982. "Inflation: Causes and Effects," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number hall82-1, June.
    12. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
    13. Burdekin, Richard C K & Laney, Leroy O, 1988. "Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 647-662.
    14. Ben Bernanke & Frederic Mishkin, 1992. "Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations from Six Industrialized Countries," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, Volume 7, pages 183-238 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 1994. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et politique budgétaire," Working Papers 1994-02, CEPII research center.
    16. International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence; Issues and Experience," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Robert E. Hall, 1982. "Introduction to "Inflation: Causes and Effects"," NBER Chapters,in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 1-10 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
    19. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    20. Jean-Pierre Patat & Jacques Bozzi, 1993. "Les politiques monétaires au cours du cycle économique," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(3), pages 51-64.
    21. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
    22. Jean-Pierre Petit, 1992. "Contenu et critères de l'indépendance des Banques centrales," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(3), pages 19-30.
    23. Jean-Marc Daniel & Alain Gubian & Hélène Harasty, 1993. "Finances publiques en Europe : un blocage généralisé ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(1), pages 175-209.
    24. Michel Aglietta, 1993. "Crises et cycles financiers : une approche comparative," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(3), pages 5-50.
    25. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schwäbe, Carsten, 2013. "Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat," CIW Discussion Papers 3/2013, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    2. Yannick LUCOTTE, 2009. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Analysis," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 303, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409651. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.