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On the performance of Monetary Policy Committees

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne Farvaque

    (EDEHN-Université du Havre & Skema Business School, Lille (France))

  • Piotr Stanek

    (Cracow University of Economics)

  • Stephane Vigeant

    (Equippe – Universités de Lille & IESEG School of Management, Lille (France))

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of the biographical experience of monetary policy committee members on their performance in managing inflation and output volatility. Our sample covers major OECD countries in the 1999 to 2010 period. Using data envelopment analysis, we study the efficiency of monetary policy committees. Then, we look at the determinants of these performances. The results in particular show that (i) a larger number of governors is more efficient, except in crisis time, (ii) a policymakers' background influence the performance, with a positive role for committee members issued from academia, central banks and the financial sector. It is also shown that some committees have reduced the inefficiency created by the crisis more rapidly than others.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek & Stephane Vigeant, 2013. "On the performance of Monetary Policy Committees," NBP Working Papers 154, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Alexander & Latsos, Sophia, 2015. "Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 173-183.
    2. Ekor, Maxwell & Saka, Jimoh & Adeniyi, Oluwatosin, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee and Monetary Policy Conduct in Nigeria: A Preliminary Investigation," MPRA Paper 60770, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Diouf, Ibrahima & Pépin, Dominique, 2017. "Gender and central banking," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 193-206.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banking; Committees; DEA; Economic volatility; Governance;

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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