Optimal Term Length for an Overconfident Central Banker
This paper discusses the implications of overconfidence when it affects a monetary policy-maker. We consider two forms of overconfidence: the illusion of precision and the illusion of control. Embedding them in a standard New Keynesian framework, we derive the optimal term length of a central banker and examine how it depends on the types and degrees of overconfidence. In particular, we show that the legal mandate should be lengthened when these two types of biases increase concurrently.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2013|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2013|
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