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Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths: Comment


  • Xiang Lin


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Suggested Citation

  • Xiang Lin, 1999. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1056-1062, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:4:p:1056-1062 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.1056

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    3. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-1153, December.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    5. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. repec:wsi:serxxx:v:62:y:2017:i:01:n:s0217590816500107 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda, 2017. "Optimal Term Length For An Overconfident Central Banker," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 62(01), pages 179-192, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation


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