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Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps

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  • Taisuke Nakata
  • Sebastian Schmidt
  • Paul Yoo

Abstract

The zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on interest rates makes speed limit policies (SLPs)---policies aimed at stabilizing the output growth---less effective. Away from the ZLB, the history dependence induced by a concern for output growth stabilization improves the inflation-output tradeoff for a discretionary central bank. However, in the aftermath of a deep recession with a binding ZLB, a central bank with an objective for output growth stabilization aims to engineer a more gradual increase in output than under the standard discretionary policy. The anticipation of a more restrained recovery exacerbates the declines in inflation and output when the lower bound is binding.

Suggested Citation

  • Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, 2018. "Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-050, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 19 Jul 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-50
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2018.050
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018050pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christiano, Lawrence J. & Fisher, Jonas D. M., 2000. "Algorithms for solving dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1179-1232, July.
    2. Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús & Gordon, Grey & Guerrón-Quintana, Pablo & Rubio-Ramírez, Juan F., 2015. "Nonlinear adventures at the zero lower bound," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 182-204.
    3. Timothy S. Hills & Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2016. "The Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-9, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Roberto M. Billi, 2011. "Output gaps and monetary policy at low interest rates," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 96(Q I).
    5. Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Conservatism and liquidity traps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 37-47.
    6. Richter Alexander W. & Throckmorton Nathaniel A., 2015. "The zero lower bound: frequency, duration, and numerical convergence," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-26, January.
    7. Billi, Roberto M., 2017. "A Note On Nominal Gdp Targeting And The Zero Lower Bound," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(8), pages 2138-2157, December.
    8. Martin Bodenstein & Junzhu Zhao, 2019. "On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(8), pages 2077-2113, December.
    9. Lilia Maliar & Serguei Maliar, 2015. "Merging simulation and projection approaches to solve high‐dimensional problems with an application to a new Keynesian model," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), pages 1-47, March.
    10. Livio Stracca, 2007. "A Speed Limit Monetary Policy Rule for the Euro Area," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 21-41, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hills, Timothy S. & Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Effective lower bound risk," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liquidity traps; Zero lower bound; Speed limit policy; Markov-perfect equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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