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Designing target rules for international monetary policy cooperation

  • Gianluca Benigno
  • Pierpaolo Benigno

This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers. It is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained-efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy. It might be the case either for fixed or floating exchange rates. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3759/
File Function: Open access version.
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Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 3759.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:3759
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Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/

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  1. Gianluca Benigno & Pierpaolo Benigno, 2003. "Price Stability in Open Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 743-764.
  2. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  3. Henrik Jensen, . "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-23, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Sutherland, Alan, 2002. "A Simple Second-Order Solution Method For Dynamic General Equilibrium Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 3554, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000384, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Dale W. Henderson & Jinill Kim, 1999. "Exact utilities under alternative monetary rules in a simple macro model with optimizing agents," International Finance Discussion Papers 635, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Sbordone, A.M., 1998. "Prices and Unit Labor Costs: a New Test of Price Stickiness," Papers 653, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  8. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, June.
  9. Sutherland, Alan, 2002. "International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration," Working Paper Series 0174, European Central Bank.
  10. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Inflation Targeting Rules," NBER Working Papers 9939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  12. Alan Sutherland, 2005. "Cost-push shocks and monetary policy in open economies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-33, January.
  13. Kollmann, Robert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Rules in an Interdependent World," CEPR Discussion Papers 4012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2002. "A simple approach to international monetary policy coordination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 177-196, June.
  15. Marc P. Giannoni, 2010. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules in a Forward-Looking Model, and Inflation Stabilization versus Price-Level Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 15986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-64, October.
  17. Cedric Tille, 2002. "How valuable is exchange rate flexibility? Optimal monetary policy under sectoral shocks," Staff Reports 147, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
  19. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2004. "Targeting Rules vs. Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy: What is Wrong with McCallum and Nelson?," NBER Working Papers 10747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
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