IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01224266.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Gender And Central Banking

Author

Listed:
  • Ibrahima Diouf

    (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers)

  • Dominique Pépin

    (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers)

Abstract

Female Central Bank chairs represent but a tiny minority. To understand why, this article analyzes socioeconomic and socio-political characteristics of the countries where females have chaired Central Banks. Then, it suggests that gender differences in preferences as regards monetary policy goals may have some influence. This hypothesis is based on an empirical analysis showing that female Central Bank chairs focus more than their male colleagues on achieving the price stability goal. This means, then, that females are more resistant than males to political pressures. Finally, it concludes that gender differences in degree of conservatism, may be an explanatory factor in female underrepresentation in the Central Bank chairs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ibrahima Diouf & Dominique Pépin, 2017. "Gender And Central Banking," Post-Print hal-01224266, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01224266
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.006
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01224266v3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01224266v3/document
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McCleary, Rachel & Barro, Robert, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," Scholarly Articles 3708464, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    3. Hale, Galina & Regev, Tali, 2014. "Gender ratios at top PhD programs in economics," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 55-70.
    4. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
    5. Scheve, Kenneth, 2004. "Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-34, February.
    6. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Mahieu, Ronald J & Raes, Louis, 2015. "Hawks and Doves at the FOMC," CEPR Discussion Papers 10442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    8. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 213-233, March.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    11. Krause, Stefan & Méndez, Fabio, 2008. "Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 282-307, March.
    12. Ibrahima Diouf & Dominique Pépin, 2010. "Duisenberg and Trichet: Measures of their Degree of Conservatism," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(2), pages 145-162.
    13. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Michael Ehrmann, 2002. "Does Inflation Targeting Increase Output Volatility?: An International Comparison of Policymakers' Preferences and Outcomes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 9, pages 247-274 Central Bank of Chile.
    14. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, May.
    15. Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek & Stéphane Vigeant, 2014. "On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 177-203, May.
    16. Tachibana, Minoru, 2004. "Central Banks' preferences in Japan, the UK, and the US," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 81-93, January.
    17. A. Alesina & P. Giuliano., 2016. "Culture and institutions," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 10.
    18. Favero, Carlo A & Rovelli, Riccardo, 2003. " Macroeconomic Stability and the Preferences of the Fed: A Formal Analysis, 1961-98," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 545-556, August.
    19. Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2005. "Policy Makers' Preferences, Party Ideology, and the Political Business Cycle," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 752-767, April.
    20. Efrem Castelnuovo & Paolo Surico, 2003. "What does Monetary Policy Reveal about a Central Bank's Preferences?," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 32(3), pages 335-359, November.
    21. Etienne Farvaque & Alexander Mihailov, 2008. "Intergenerational Transmission of Inflation Aversion: Theory and Evidence," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2008-71, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    22. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7717 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Richard Dennis, 2006. "The policy preferences of the US Federal Reserve," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(1), pages 55-77.
    24. Henry W. Chappell Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
    25. Hamza Bennani & Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek, 2015. "FOMC members’ incentives to disagree: regional motives and background influences," NBP Working Papers 221, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
    26. Ozlale, Umit, 2003. "Price stability vs. output stability: tales of federal reserve administrations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1595-1610, July.
    27. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    28. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
    29. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:59-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
    3. Charléty, Patricia & Romelli, Davide & Santacreu-Vasut, Estefania, 2017. "Appointments to central bank boards: Does gender matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 59-61.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; Central Bank; gender gap; preference parameters; female; conservatism;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01224266. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.