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Great Power, Great Responsibility: Addressing the Underestimated Issue of Central Bank’s Social Responsibility

Author

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  • Guillaume Vallet

    (Faculty of Economics, CREG, University of Grenoble Alpes, France)

Abstract

This paper deals with the neglected issue of central banks’ social responsibility. Since central banks exert the “structural power” on economies as well as on societies, their power should be regulated and controlled by society through a reliable framework of social responsibility. To that aim, this article sheds light on the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of central bank’s social responsibility: I suggest reforms in order to increase central banks’ social legitimacy, while being consistent with the mapping out of a new framework of social responsibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Vallet, 2021. "Great Power, Great Responsibility: Addressing the Underestimated Issue of Central Bank’s Social Responsibility," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 10(3), pages 23-39.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbk:journl:v:10:y:2021:i:3:p:23-39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central banks; power; social responsibility; social legitimacy; institutions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E14 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Austrian; Evolutionary; Institutional
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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