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A simple Empirical Measure of Central Bank's Conservatism

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  • Grégory Levieuge

    () (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yannick Lucotte

    () (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper we suggest a simple empirical and model independent measure of Central Banks' Conservatism, based on the Taylor curve. This new indicator can easily be extended in time and space, whatever the underlying monetary regime of the considered countries. We demonstrate that it evolves in accordance with the monetary experiences of 32 OECD member countries from 1980, and is largely equivalent to the model-based measure provided by Krause & M endez [Southern Economic Journal, 2005]. We nally bring forward the interest of such an indicator for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Grégory Levieuge & Yannick Lucotte, 2012. "A simple Empirical Measure of Central Bank's Conservatism," Working Papers halshs-00827680, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00827680
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00827680
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2017. "Can we Identify the Fed's Preferences?," EconStor Preprints 149993, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    2. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Qureshi, Irfan, 2015. "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 81646, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2017.
    4. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vassileios & Magkonis, Georgios & Zekente, Kalliopi-Maria, 2016. "The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 11-13.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Banks' preferences; Conservatism; Taylor curve; Taylor rule; Préférences Banques Centrales; conservatisme; courbe de Taylor; règle de Taylor;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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