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FOMC members’ incentives to disagree: regional motives and background influences

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  • Hamza Bennani
  • Etienne Farvaque
  • Piotr Stanek

Abstract

We study determinants of individual FOMC members disagreement with the decided policy rate. Utilizing a novel dataset of macroeconomic indicators for the Fed districts and preferences revealed by FOMC members in the transcripts, we construct individual reaction functions for each member for the period 1994-2008. Then, we explain the gap between each member’s preferred rate and the adopted policy rate by individual background characteristics. First, we find that FOMC members tend to react to regional economic conditions, in particular the unemployment rate. Second, that Professors, and individuals holding a master degree or issued from either private or public sector have a higher propensity to disagree on the dovish side during the meetings, while female members as well as governors nominated by a Democrat President tend to disagree on the hawkish side (as compared to the “reference†member, who is a male, PhD holder, Regional Bank President with experience in the financial sector). Moreover, we show that, under Ben Bernanke, in a period a large economic uncertainty, the propensity to disagree increased for all types of members.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamza Bennani & Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek, 2015. "FOMC members’ incentives to disagree: regional motives and background influences," NBP Working Papers 221, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Romer, 2010. "A New Data Set on Monetary Policy: The Economic Forecasts of Individual Members of the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 951-957, August.
    2. A. Jung, 2013. "Policymakers’ Interest Rate Preferences: Recent Evidence for Three Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(3), pages 150-197, September.
    3. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    4. Sirchenko Andrei, 2012. "A model for ordinal responses with an application to policy interest rate," EERC Working Paper Series 12/13e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    5. Johnson, Eric D. & Ellis, Michael A. & Kotenko, Diana, 2012. "Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 368-371.
    6. Roland Hodler & Paul A. Raschky, 2014. "Regional Favoritism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(2), pages 995-1033.
    7. Roman Horvath & Marek Rusnak & Katerina Smidkova & Jan Zapal, 2014. "The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 450-461, February.
    8. Yash P. Mehra & Bansi Sawhney, 2010. "Inflation measure, Taylor rules, and the Greenspan-Bernanke years," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 123-151.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Alexander & Latsos, Sophia, 2015. "Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 173-183.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Diouf, Ibrahima & Pépin, Dominique, 2017. "Gender and central banking," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 193-206.
    4. Hamza Bennani, 2016. "Measuring Monetary Policy Stress for Fed District Representatives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 156-176, May.
    5. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transcripts; FOMC; Interest Rate; Individual Taylor Rule.;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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