Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences
We document a behavioral idiosyncrasy in which Federal Reserve Bank presidents prefer tighter monetary policy at the end of their tenures. This suggests that consensus building on the Federal Open Market Committee occurs by moderating the policy preferences expressed by the presidents, rather than convincing them the consensus policy is superior.
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