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Central bank tone and the dispersion of views within monetary policy committees

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  • Paul Hubert

    () (Sciences Po - OFCE)

  • Fabien Labondance

    () (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE)

Abstract

Does policymakers’ choice of words matter? We explore empirically whether central bank tone conveyed in FOMC statements contains useful information for financial market participants. We quantify central bank tone using computational linguistics and identify exogenous shocks to central bank tone orthogonal to the state of the economy. Using an ARCH model and a high-frequency approach, we find that positive central bank tone increases interest rates at the 1-year maturity. We therefore investigate which potential pieces of information could be revealed by central bank tone. Our tests suggest that it relates to the dispersion of views among FOMC members. This information may be useful to financial markets to understand current and future policy decisions. Finally, we show that central bank tone helps predicting future policy decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2019. "Central bank tone and the dispersion of views within monetary policy committees," Working Papers 2019-08, CRESE.
  • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-08
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    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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