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New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence

In: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision

Author

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  • Lucia Dalla Pellegrina
  • Donato Masciandaro
  • Rosaria Vega Pansini

Abstract

This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro & Rosaria Vega Pansini, 2011. "New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14064_8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, 2008. "Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 290-317, November.
    2. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    3. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 751-774, October.
    4. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    5. Charles T Carlstrom & Timothy S Fuerst, 2009. "Central Bank Independence And Inflation: A Note," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(1), pages 182-186, January.
    6. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May.
    7. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Stella, Andrea, 2010. "The Politics of Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1001-1054, Elsevier.
    10. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    11. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2011. "The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetarypolicy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 54-79, January.
    12. World Bank, 2007. "World Development Indicators 2007," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 8150, September.
    13. Daniel Kaufmann, 2004. "Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World," Public Economics 0411009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob Haan, 2010. "Central bank independence and inflation revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 445-457, September.
    15. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    16. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:03:p:407-423_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Sami Alpanda & Adam Honig, 2009. "The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(7), pages 1365-1389, October.
    18. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Carolina Osorio & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2009. "Analysis of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: A New Paradigm," CESifo Working Paper Series 2885, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Cohen-Cole, Ethan & Morse, Jonathan, 2010. "Monetary policy and capital regulation in the US and Europe," Working Paper Series 1222, European Central Bank.
    20. Berriel Tiago C & Bhattarai Saroj, 2009. "Monetary Policy and Central Bank Balance Sheet Concerns," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, January.
    21. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2009. "Using Taylor Rule to Explain Effects of Institutional Changes in Central Banks," Discussion Papers 46, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    22. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2009. "Central bank independence and financial instability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 321-338, December.
    23. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2008. "Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relation with inflation?," Discussion Papers 37, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    24. Charles Goodhart, 2000. "The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision," FMG Special Papers sp127, Financial Markets Group.
    25. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2010. "Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1003-1023, October.
    26. Yoshiharu Oritani, 2010. "Public governance of central banks: an approach from new institutional economics," BIS Working Papers 299, Bank for International Settlements.
    27. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc, 2008. "Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 153-173, August.
    28. Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Masciandaro Donato, 2012. "Back to the Future?," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 112-130, July.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.

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