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Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy

  • Roman Horváth


    (Charles University, Prague and IOS, Regensburg)

  • Kateřina Šmídková
  • Jan Zápal

We assess whether the voting records of central bank boards are informative about future monetary policy using data on five inflation targeting countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). We find that in all countries the voting records, namely the difference between the average voted-for and actually implemented policy rate, signal future monetary policy, making a case for publishing the records. This result holds even if we control for the financial market expectations; include the voting records from the period covering the current global financial crisis and examine the differences in timing and style of the voting record announcements.

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Paper provided by Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and South-East European Studies) in its series Working Papers with number 316.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ost:wpaper:316
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