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How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates

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  • Etienne Farvaque
  • Norimichi Matsueda
  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

Abstract

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:08-026
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    Cited by:

    1. Maqsood Aslam & Etienne Farvaque & Franck Malan, 2021. "A disaster always rings twice: Early life experiences and central bankers' reactions to natural disasters," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(3), pages 301-320, August.
    2. Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2013. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s decision rule," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 37, pages 135-160, October.
    3. Horváth, Roman & Jonášová, Júlia, 2015. "Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 229-243.
    4. Roman Horváth & Katerina Šmídková & Jan Zápal, 2012. "Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 8(4), pages 1-19, December.
    5. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, May.
    6. Dumiter Florin Cornel, 2012. "The Crucial Role Of Central Bank Transparency In Assessing The Monetary Policy Committee Mechanism," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 557-563, December.
    7. Hamza Bennani, 2016. "Measuring Monetary Policy Stress for Fed District Representatives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 156-176, May.
    8. Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    9. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    10. Tim Aldridge & Amy Wood, 2014. "Monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures: some cross-country comparisons," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-30, March.
    11. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy Mcgregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2014. "Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(4), pages 665-692, June.
    12. Vidal, Jean-Pierre & Maurin, Vincent, 2012. "Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules," Working Paper Series 1434, European Central Bank.
    13. Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
    14. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy Committees; Decision Procedures; Interest-rate; Monetary Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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