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Federal Monetary Policy

  • Carsten Hefeker

What is the optimal institutional structure for a federal central bank? The framework developed in this paper is used to analyze under what conditions an individual region will prefer a monetary union to be organized according to regional or common influences and how a combination of both can be rationalized. The implications of an enlargement of a monetary union for changes in its institutional setup are also derived. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2003 .

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 105 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 643-659

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:105:y:2003:i:4:p:643-659
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  1. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
  2. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  3. Todd E. Clark & Kwanho Shin, 1998. "The sources of fluctuations within and across countries," Research Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  4. Wyplosz, Charles, 1997. "EMU: Why and How It Might Happen," CEPR Discussion Papers 1685, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  6. GrĂ¼ner, Hans Peter, 1999. "On the Role of Conflicting National Interests in the ECB Council," CEPR Discussion Papers 2192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 1993. "On The Feasibility Of A One-Speed Or Multispeed European Monetary Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 145-165, 07.
  8. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
  9. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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