Federal Monetary Policy
What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational monetary union and it is shown which organizational structure of a common central bank is optimal for participating countries and when they are willing to join. The implications for an enlargement of a monetary union are derived as well.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
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- Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
- Wyplosz, Charles, 1997.
"EMU: Why and How It Might Happen,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1685, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,"
NBER Working Papers
0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
- Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 1993. "On The Feasibility Of A One-Speed Or Multispeed European Monetary Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 145-165, 07.
- Todd E. Clark & Kwanho Shin, 1998. "The sources of fluctuations within and across countries," Research Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- Grüner, Hans Peter, 1999. "On the Role of Conflicting National Interests in the ECB Council," CEPR Discussion Papers 2192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
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