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One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation

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  • Fatum, Rasmus

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  • Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:4:p:659-669
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    1. Dolado, Juan J. & Dolado, Juan J. & Griffiths, Mark & Padilla, A. Jorge & Padilla, A. Jorge, 1994. "Delegation in international monetary policy games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1057-1069, May.
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    8. Rudi Dornbusch & Carlo Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 16-64.
    9. Süppel, Ralph & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1994. "Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December.
    11. Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
    12. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
    13. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    14. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    15. Canzoneri,Matthew B. & Grilli,Vittorio & Masson,Paul R. (ed.), 1992. "Establishing a Central Bank," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521420983, September.
    16. Debrun, Xavier, 2001. "Bargaining over EMU vs. EMS: Why Might the ECB Be the Twin Sister of the Bundesbank?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 566-590, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2016. "The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 997-1015, August.
    2. Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2013. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s decision rule," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 37, pages 135-160, October.
    3. Farvaque, Etienne & Matsueda, Norimichi & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2009. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 534-546, December.
    4. Berentsen, Aleksander & Strub, Carlo, 2009. "Central bank design with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 139-152, February.
    5. Irena Radović, 2009. "Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(1), pages 95-110, March.
    6. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," DULBEA Working Papers 07-11.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "The monetary policy consequences of enlargement," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(04), pages 29-34, December.
    8. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3900, CESifo.
    9. Zeno Rotondi & Giacomo Vaciago, 2007. "Lessons from the ECB Experience: Frankfurt Still Matters!," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 36(2), pages 147-170, July.
    10. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    11. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "The monetary policy consequences of enlargement," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 29-34, December.
    12. Heinemann Friedrich & Kemper Jan, 2021. "The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 5-30, December.
    13. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1767, CESifo.
    14. Hefeker Carsten, 2011. "Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 274-285, August.

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