Exit expectations and the optimal design of a currency union
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112143
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal currency areas; Inflation bias; Time inconsistency; Monetary policy; Monetary union; Central banking;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
Statistics
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