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Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions


  • Süppel, Ralph
  • von Hagen, Jürgen


Historical experience suggests that the distribution of monetary policy authority among the members of a monetary union is a key aspect of the design of a central bank constitution. We analyse alternative institutional solutions to that problem with different degrees of centralization of monetary policy decisions. The degree of centralization required to facilitate credible, low-inflation policies depends critically on the political structure of the monetary union. Efficient monetary stabilization requires centralized decision-making rules. Whether or not stabilization can be improved by adding central appointees to member state representatives on the central bank council depends on the stochastic structure of the relevant economic disturbances.

Suggested Citation

  • Süppel, Ralph & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1994. "Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:919

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    2. Montoro, Carlos, 2007. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate smoothing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2006. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union Under Alternative Labour-Market Structures," Working Papers of BETA 2006-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    4. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    5. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Fidrmuc, J. & Horváth, J., 1998. "Stability of Monetary Unions : Lessons from the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia," Discussion Paper 1998-74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
    8. Laurent GAGNOL & Moise SIDIROPOULOS, 2001. "The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries," Working Papers of BETA 2001-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    9. Ivo Arnold, 1999. "The third leg of the stool: Financial stability as a prerequisite for EMU," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 135(2), pages 280-305, June.
    10. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2004. "The effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees," MEB Series (discontinued) 2004-01, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
    11. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    12. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
    13. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April.
    14. Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation," Working Papers 2007-003, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    15. Hans Peter Grüner & Alexandra Kiel, 2001. "Collective decisions with interdependent valuations," GK working paper series 2001-02, Post Graduate Programme "Allocation on Financial Markets", University of Mannheim, revised Sep 2001.
    16. Grüner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra, 2001. "Collective Decisions with Interdependent Valuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item


    Central Banks; Monetary Policy; Monetary Union;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration


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