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The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control

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  • Aytimur, R. Emre
  • Boukouras, Aristotelis
  • Schwager, Robert

Abstract

We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates´ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • Aytimur, R. Emre & Boukouras, Aristotelis & Schwager, Robert, 2015. "The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 240, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elections; polarization; strategic delegation; bureaucracy; foreign influence;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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