IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v49y2016i3p997-1015.html

The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization

Author

Listed:
  • R. Emre Aytimur
  • Aristotelis Boukouras
  • Robert Schwager

Abstract

We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2016. "The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 997-1015, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:3:p:997-1015
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12222
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12222
    Download Restriction: access restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/caje.12222?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:3:p:997-1015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.