The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidatesâ€™ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median votersâ€™ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
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