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The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

  • R. Emre Aytimur
  • Aristotelis Boukouras
  • Robert Schwager

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters’ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3900.

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Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3900
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  1. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
  2. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," Department of Economics Working Papers 07-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  3. Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
  4. John E. Roemer, 2004. "Indeterminacy of Citizen-candidate Equilibrium," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm350, Yale School of Management.
  5. repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:1:p:85-114 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
  7. Bard Hastad, 2007. "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1442, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 0803, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  9. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84.
  10. Christopher Chambers, 2007. "Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 285-309, November.
  11. repec:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:4:p:689-701 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. repec:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:67-82 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Hamlin, Alan & Hjortlund, Michael, 2000. " Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 205-30, June.
  14. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, June.
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