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Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?

  • N. Nergiz Dincer
  • Barry Eichengreen

Greater transparency in central bank operations is the most dramatic change in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years. In this paper we present new information on its extent and effects. We show that the trend is general: a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency since the late 1990s. We then analyze the determinants and effects of central bank transparency in an integrated empirical framework. Transparency is greater in countries with more stable and developed political systems and deeper and more developed financial markets. Our preliminary analysis suggests broadly favorable if relatively weak impacts on inflation and output variability.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13003.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13003
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  1. Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  3. Geraats, Petra M., 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 0041, European Central Bank.
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  5. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," CEPR Discussion Papers 3639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Andrew G Haldane & Vicky Read, 2000. "Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve," Bank of England working papers 106, Bank of England.
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  8. Geraats, P.M., 2005. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0557, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  9. Henrik Jensen, . "Optimal Degrees of Tranaparency in Monetary Policymaking," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  10. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
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    • Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth & Savastano, Miguel, 2003. "Debt intolerance," MPRA Paper 13932, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May.
  13. Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "How much should central banks talk?: A new argument," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 195-198, October.
  14. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Other publications TiSEM b34dfb1f-520f-4787-a08f-5, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Chadha, Jagjit S. & Nolan, Charles, 2001. "Inflation Targeting, Transparency and Interest Rate Volatility: Ditching Monetary Mystique in the U.K," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 349-366, July.
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  17. repec:rus:hseeco:123922 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2000. "Inflation, Monetary Transparency, and G3 Exchange Rate Volatility," Working Paper Series WP00-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  19. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
  20. Muller, P. & M. Zelmer, 1999. "Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets," Technical Reports 86, Bank of Canada.
  21. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  22. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  23. Barry Eichengreen & Raul Razo-Garcia, 2006. "The international monetary system in the last and next 20 years," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(47), pages 393-442, 07.
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  25. Jakob Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink & Sandra Waller, 2004. "The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 775-794, November.
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