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Auction design in the presence of collusion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jiaru Bai & H. Sebastian Heese & Manish Tripathy, 2023. "Hiding in plain sight: Surge pricing and strategic providers," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(12), pages 3837-3855, December.
  2. SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-138, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  4. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2269-2300.
  5. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  6. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
  7. Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023. "Secret vs Public Rings in Common Value Auctions," EconStor Preprints 279484, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  8. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Jun Nakabayashi & Kei Kawai, 2020. "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers 2020-59, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  9. Olga Gorelkina, 2018. "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers 20182, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
  10. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
  11. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Bidding collusion without passive updating," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-77.
  12. Gagan Aggarwal & Kshipra Bhawalkar & Guru Guruganesh & Andres Perlroth, 2021. "Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries," Papers 2111.10472, arXiv.org.
  13. Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian & Zhe Yang, 2017. "Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 177-229, September.
  14. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2016. "Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 168-201, May.
  15. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 662-690, September.
  16. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  17. Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  18. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
  19. Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo, 2018. "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 398-435.
  20. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
  21. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2014. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design in Two-Agent Nonlinear Pricing Environments," MPRA Paper 57931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Marquez, Robert & Singh, Rajdeep, 2013. "The economics of club bidding and value creation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 493-505.
  23. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
  24. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
  25. Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020. "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 290-317.
  26. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Jun Nakabayashi & Kei Kawai, 2022. "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers 2022-23, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  27. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  28. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  29. Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2024. "Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  30. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
  31. Daniel Montanera & Abhay Nath Mishra & T. S. Raghu, 2022. "Mitigating Risk Selection in Healthcare Entitlement Programs: A Beneficiary-Level Competitive Bidding Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1221-1247, December.
  32. Palacio, Sebastián M., 2020. "Predicting collusive patterns in a liberalized electricity market with mandatory auctions of forward contracts," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
  33. Jinwoo Kim, 2023. "Strong Collusion-Proof Implementation," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 39, pages 241-256.
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