Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case
Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent effectively employs the other agent's labor. Exactly two rules satisfy symmetry; a result in sharp contrast with Moulin and Shenker's characterization of their serial mechanism as the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying the same incentives property [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60 (5), 1009-1037]. We also show that the familiar stand-alone test characterizes the class of fixed-path methods under our incentives criterion [Friedman, E.J., 2004. Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing. Econ. Theory 23, 643-658].
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