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The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, DENMARK)

  • Lars Thorlund-Petersen

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, DENMARK)

Abstract

The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen, 2000. "The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 355-362.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:355-362
    Note: Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jens Hougaard & Lars Østerdal, 2009. "Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 469-479, November.
    2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 2001. "Mixed serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 51-68, January.
    3. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
    4. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Serial cost sharing; The stand-alone test; The core.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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