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- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Corchón

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • M. Socorro Puy

    (Universidad de Málaga)

Abstract

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair, 1994. "Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 189-207, August.
    2. Louis J. Billera & David C. Heath, 1982. "Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 32-39, February.
    3. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
    2. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2009. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 143-154, March.
    3. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Zhou Zhou, 2023. "Optimal Relative Performance Criteria in Mean-Field Contribution Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 48(4), pages 2233-2266, November.
    5. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
    6. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    7. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    8. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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