- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published by Ivie|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
- Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair, 1994. "Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 189-207, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.