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Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

Author

Listed:
  • Luis C. Corchón

    (Departamento de Economi´a, Universidad Carlos III, 28903 Getafe , Spain)

  • M. Socorro Puy

    (Departamento de Teori´a e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, Campus el Ejido, 29013 Málaga, Spain)

Abstract

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis C. Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2002. "Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 369-379.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:369-379
    Note: Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 15 November 2000
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    Cited by:

    1. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
    2. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2009. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 143-154, March.
    3. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    4. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    5. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
    6. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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