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Cost allocation in partition functionform games


  • Lech Krus

    () (Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland)


A cooperative game in partition function form is proposed for a cost allocation problem. The game describes a real situation in which a payoff of any coalition does not only depend on the players in the coalition but also on the coalition structure of the other players. Solution concepts like the stable set and the core are analyzed. Relations of the concepts in the case of the game in partition function form and of an appropriately formulated game in characteristic function form are shown.

Suggested Citation

  • Lech Krus, 2009. "Cost allocation in partition functionform games," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 2, pages 39-49.
  • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:39-49

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. R. M. Thrall & W. F. Lucas, 1963. "N‐person games in partition function form," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 281-298, March.
    2. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    3. Kóczy, László Á., 2009. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 559-565, May.
    4. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    5. László Kóczy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August.
    6. Patrick Legros, 1986. "Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7050, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. repec:cor:louvrp:-1276 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Krus, Lech & Bronisz, Piotr, 2000. "Cooperative game solution concepts to a cost allocation problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 258-271, April.
    9. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2003. "Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, May.
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